Why Lycurgus Is Rarely Taught in Ethics Education: A Critical Examination of the Spartan Lawgiver

Autonomy, Collectivism, Ethics, Ethics Education, Lycurgus, Moral Education, Plutarch, Social Agency, Sparta, Virtue 0 comments

Lycurgus between myth and modernity

AI-generated picture by Prof. Jonathan Acuña Solano in February 2026

Introductory Note to the Reader

I begin this reflection with a necessary clarification: I am not an ethicist by training, but an educator deeply interested in ethics and morality as fertile ground for higher-order thinking, dialogue, and intellectual challenge among teachers and scholars. My professional engagement with ethics does not stem from normative theory-building, but from the classroom and from conversations that seek to interrogate values, assumptions, and historical models of moral life.

My reading of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans has opened a window into ethical worlds that are rarely explored in contemporary academic discourse. These ancient biographies, far from being mere historical accounts, function as moral laboratories in which alternative visions of virtue, citizenship, education, and social order are tested. Encountering figures such as Lycurgus has allowed me to revisit ethical questions that modern curricula often overlook or avoid, particularly those that challenge liberal assumptions about autonomy, discipline, and collective responsibility.

This essay is therefore offered not as a definitive ethical judgment, but as food for thought—an invitation to reconsider why certain moral models from antiquity are marginalized, and what might be gained pedagogically by engaging with them critically. My intention is to contribute to reflective dialogue rather than to prescribe conclusions.

Jonathan Acuña Solano

Why Lycurgus Is Rarely Taught in Ethics Education: A Critical Examination of the Spartan Lawgiver

Abstract

This essay examines the relative absence of Lycurgus, the legendary Spartan lawgiver, from contemporary ethics education and humanities curricula. Drawing primarily on Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus and supported by modern classical scholarship, the paper argues that Lycurgus is largely excluded because his moral project conflicts with modern ethical priorities centered on individual autonomy, human rights, and personal agency. Additionally, the essay explores the pedagogical difficulties posed by the authoritarian, militaristic, and coercive dimensions of Spartan society, as well as the scholarly uncertainty surrounding Lycurgus’ historical existence. Moving beyond ethics narrowly conceived, the discussion also considers Lycurgus as a proto-collectivist thinker whose reforms anticipate later debates on communal ownership, moral discipline, and social harmony. Rather than advocating for Lycurgus’ ethical model, the essay proposes his case as a valuable—though uncomfortable—tool for higher-order ethical reflection and critical debate in university-level education.

Keywords:

Lycurgus, Plutarch, Ethics, Ethics Education, Sparta, Moral Education, Collectivism, Autonomy, Virtue, Social Agency

Resumen

Este ensayo analiza la escasa presencia de Licurgo, el legendario legislador espartano, en los programas contemporáneos de ética y humanidades. A partir de la Vida de Licurgo de Plutarco y del aporte de la investigación clásica moderna, el texto sostiene que Licurgo suele quedar excluido debido a que su proyecto moral entra en conflicto con los principios éticos actuales centrados en la autonomía individual, los derechos humanos y la agencia personal. Asimismo, se examinan las dificultades pedagógicas que plantea el carácter autoritario, militarista y coercitivo de la sociedad espartana, así como la incertidumbre historiográfica en torno a la existencia real de Licurgo. Más allá de la ética en sentido estricto, el ensayo también considera a Licurgo como un pensador proto-colectivista cuyas reformas anticipan debates posteriores sobre propiedad comunal, disciplina moral y armonía social. Lejos de proponer su modelo como ideal, el texto defiende su valor como caso de estudio para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico y el análisis ético de alto nivel en la educación universitaria.

Resumo

Este ensaio examina a ausência relativa de Licurgo, o lendário legislador espartano, nos currículos contemporâneos de ética e humanidades. Com base principalmente na Vida de Licurgo de Plutarco e no apoio da pesquisa clássica moderna, o texto argumenta que Licurgo é frequentemente excluído por entrar em conflito com as prioridades éticas atuais, centradas na autonomia individual, nos direitos humanos e na agência pessoal. O ensaio também analisa as dificuldades pedagógicas decorrentes das dimensões autoritárias, militaristas e coercitivas da sociedade espartana, bem como as dúvidas historiográficas sobre a existência histórica de Licurgo. Para além da ética normativa, o estudo considera Licurgo como um pensador proto-coletivista cujas reformas antecipam debates posteriores sobre propriedade comum, disciplina moral e harmonia social. O objetivo não é defender seu modelo, mas apresentá-lo como um estudo de caso provocador para o desenvolvimento do pensamento crítico e da reflexão ética no ensino superior.

Introduction

Ethics curricula in modern universities routinely highlight philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, Mill, and contemporary moral theorists. Yet Lycurgus, the legendary Spartan lawgiver whom Plutarch credits with reshaping an entire society, rarely appears in ethical discussions, even as a counterexample. This absence is striking because Lycurgus’ reforms are deeply ethical in scope: they governed desire, citizenship, moral education, civic responsibility, and the subordination of self-interest to collective welfare. Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus presents a figure who not only redesigned institutions but also engineered a normative code for the Spartan way of life. Despite this, Lycurgus is often excluded from humanities and ethics courses.

This essay (my blog post #522) argues that Lycurgus is absent because (1) modern ethics emphasizes individual autonomy, not collective discipline; (2) contemporary humanistic education avoids valorizing illiberal or militaristic systems; and (3) scholarship questions the historical reliability of Lycurgus, diminishing his value for philosophical instruction. By examining Plutarch’s account and modern scholarship, this blog post demonstrates why Lycurgus’ ideas remain largely undebated in contemporary ethical education.

Lycurgus’ Ethical Project in Plutarch

Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus portrays the Spartan lawgiver as a radical moral architect. His reforms are not merely legal or political; they aim at shaping his countrypeople’s character. Plutarch states that Lycurgus “bent the whole city to obedience, sobriety, and temperance” (Plutarch, trans. 1914, p. 53), signaling a moral, not only political, agenda. Central to this agenda was the suppression of luxury. According to Plutarch, Lycurgus believed that “the city was like a ship whose sailors mutinied when each pursued his own profit” (p. 57). The metaphor is ethical: Moral disorder arises when individual desire overrides collective good.

Lycurgus’ most famous reform, the agōgē, was explicitly an ethical program for the Spartan youths. Plutarch writes that Lycurgus “considered education the greatest and noblest task of the lawgiver” (p. 61). Through training in endurance, discipline, and obedience, Spartans internalized a civic ethic centered on virtue-as-duty. This emphasis on habituation echoes Aristotelian virtue ethics yet differs in its extremity since Aristotle advocates moderation, but Lycurgus enforces austerity and communalism.

Thus, it can be stated that Lycurgus serves as a profound case study in ethical and moral engineering. Yet despite this, he does not appear in mainstream ethics curricula. But why not?

Reason 1: Lycurgus Conflicts with Modern Ethical Emphasis on Individual Autonomy

Modern ethics education privileges frameworks grounded in personal autonomy, rational choice, and the rights of individuals. Philosophers such as Kant and Mill assume that individuals possess moral agency independent of the state or any system of government. Lycurgus represents the opposite pole: he dissolved individuality into collective identity. As Plutarch notes, under Lycurgus, “no one was permitted to live as he pleased” (p. 65). For Kantian educators, this represents heteronomy of the most extreme sort, contrary to personal autonomy and agency.

Contemporary scholars share this same concern. Cartledge (2002) argues that Spartan ethics “subordinate the individual so fully to the polis that the very notion of personal moral agency becomes blurred” (p. 88). For ethics instructors who aim to cultivate critical thinking, freedom of conscience, and reflective autonomy, Lycurgus offers a model fundamentally incompatible with contemporary pedagogical values. But his social engineering can be used as a case study to be debated in an ethics class.

In such a context, teaching Lycurgus risks seeming to legitimize authoritarian virtue. Even if presented critically, his system’s foundational rejection of autonomy limits its usefulness in ethics classrooms centered on rational self-determination. For this very reason, an ethics professor could bring Lycurgus case for debate and identification of its flaws if analyzed from the importance of individual autonomy and citizen agency.

Reason 2: The Moral Problems of Spartan Society Make Lycurgus Pedagogically Difficult

Humanities departments are increasingly attentive to issues of oppression, inequality, and structural violence. Yet Lycurgus’ reforms institutionalized systems that are ethically troubling by contemporary standards: the helot system, militarization of youth, communal spying, infanticide, and near-total state control over family life.

Plutarch describes the helots as being “kept down by force, and treated with arrogant cruelty” (p. 72). He further recounts the infamous krypteia, during which young Spartans were encouraged “to kill any helot they found in the fields” (p. 73). These passages pose severe ethical challenges for instructors, but it is worthwhile to discuss why students must be avoided. While scholars such as Hodkinson (2000) contextualize the helot system as part of archaic Greek socioeconomics, its brutality remains undeniable.

Thus, universities may avoid Lycurgus not out of oversight but out of pedagogical caution with beginning ethics students whose higher order thinking skills may not be fully developed; engaging seriously with his system requires complex discussions of violence, authoritarianism, and collective coercion whose examples can be drawn from current political affairs in various parts of the world. These topics can be valuable, but they conflict with the introductory and normative goals of many ethics courses.

Reason 3: Uncertainty About Lycurgus’ Historical Reality Reduces His Philosophical Utility

Another major reason Lycurgus is not taught stems from doubts about whether he existed at all. Plutarch himself admits that “there is great disagreement among historians concerning Lycurgus” (p. 49). Modern scholars are even more skeptical that this Spartan figure ever existed. Powell (2018) notes that “Lycurgus is better understood as a mythic placeholder for a gradual evolution of Spartan institutions” (p. 112). If the lawgiver is semi-mythical, he cannot serve as a stable anchor for ethical analysis and class discussions.

In ethics education, instructors typically rely on thinkers with reliably attributed texts or verifiable historical roles, e.g., Aristotle, Confucius, Aquinas. Lycurgus produces a pedagogical challenge: his ideas, at least as we know them, may belong more to Plutarch and the Spartan tradition than to a historical individual who governed the Lacedemonians at a given point in history. The lack of primary philosophical writings attributed to Lycurgus further decreases academic interest.

Lycurgus as a Proto-Communist Thinker

Moving beyond ethics, some scholars have noted that Lycurgus’ reforms anticipate certain features later associated with communist or collectivist ideologies that emerged during the 20th century. Although the term communism is anachronistic for antiquity, Lycurgus instituted radical property redistribution, common messes, and the erasure of visible economic inequality, measures that parallel, in spirit, Marxist critiques of private ownership.

Plutarch writes that Lycurgus “persuaded them to pool all their fortunes, and to dine together in public” (Plutarch, 1914, p. 59), a direct rejection of personal luxury and private consumption. Paul Cartledge supports this interpretation when he states that Sparta under Lycurgus “approached a uniquely collective socio-economic system, in which individual wealth, ambition, and accumulation were morally suspect” (Cartledge, 2001, p. 144). Likewise, Hodkinson (2000) argues that Lycurgus engineered a society in which wealth “had no visible function beyond serving the collective ends of the state” (p. 212).

Through these reforms, Lycurgus can be seen as one of the earliest figures to articulate a moral system premised on collective ownership, economic leveling, and the moral suspicion of private desire, ideas that resonate with later Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, collectivist philosophies even if their foundations were militaristic rather than emancipatory.

Plutarch’s Vision of Lycurgus’ Ideal City

Plutarch’s characterization of Lycurgus’ political vision reveals an aspiration not for imperial power but for moral harmony. His statement that Lycurgus believed “the happiness of a state, as of a private man, consisted chiefly in the exercise of virtue, and in the concord of the inhabitants” (Plutarch, 1914, p. 67) frames Sparta’s laws as a moral, not merely political, project.

This vision distinguishes Lycurgus from later collectivist thinkers: while modern communist theorists often emphasize economic justice or class struggle, Lycurgus’ reforms aim at cultivating virtue and sustaining concord. As Andrew Powell (2018) notes, Lycurgus’ city is imagined as “a harmonized organism whose stability derives from moral discipline and shared purpose rather than from political expansion” (p. 129). In this sense, Lycurgus’ project mirrors ancient virtues more than modern ideological systems. His goal was to create citizens “free-minded, self-dependent, and temperate,” as Plutarch writes, a combination that scholars such as Tigerstedt (1974) interpret as the core of the Spartan ethical ideal, citizens who, shaped by communal structures, embody the moral clarity that Lycurgus believed impossible in societies ruled by wealth, luxury, or unchecked individual freedom.

Plutarch’s description thus elevates Lycurgus beyond the role of lawgiver to that of moral philosopher, presenting his city as a unified ethical organism.

Conclusion

Lycurgus represents a compelling but deeply problematic figure for ethics education. Plutarch’s account portrays him as a moral reformer whose laws engineered a society of discipline, austerity, and civic devotion. Yet these same qualities, collective over individual, coercive over voluntary, militaristic over humanistic, clash with modern ethical frameworks based on autonomy, rights, and critical inquiry. Moreover, the ethically troubling aspects of Spartan society and the ambiguous historicity of Lycurgus himself complicate pedagogical use. For these reasons, Lycurgus is seldom taught in university ethics courses, despite his profound influence on ancient moral thought. His absence is not accidental but reflective of modern ethical priorities and educational aims.

San José, Costa Rica

Monday, February 2, 2026