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Introductory Note to
the Reader I begin this reflection with a necessary
clarification: I am not an ethicist by training, but an educator deeply
interested in ethics and morality as fertile ground for higher-order
thinking, dialogue, and intellectual challenge among teachers and scholars.
My professional engagement with ethics does not stem from normative
theory-building, but from the classroom and from conversations that seek to
interrogate values, assumptions, and historical models of moral life. My reading of Plutarch’s Lives of the
Noble Grecians and Romans has opened a window into ethical worlds that
are rarely explored in contemporary academic discourse. These ancient
biographies, far from being mere historical accounts, function as moral
laboratories in which alternative visions of virtue, citizenship, education,
and social order are tested. Encountering figures such as Lycurgus has
allowed me to revisit ethical questions that modern curricula often overlook
or avoid, particularly those that challenge liberal assumptions about
autonomy, discipline, and collective responsibility. This essay is therefore offered not as a
definitive ethical judgment, but as food for thought—an invitation to
reconsider why certain moral models from antiquity are marginalized, and what
might be gained pedagogically by engaging with them critically. My intention
is to contribute to reflective dialogue rather than to prescribe conclusions. Jonathan Acuña Solano |
Why Lycurgus Is Rarely Taught in Ethics Education: A Critical Examination of the Spartan Lawgiver
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Abstract This essay examines
the relative absence of Lycurgus, the legendary Spartan lawgiver, from
contemporary ethics education and humanities curricula. Drawing primarily on
Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus and supported by modern classical
scholarship, the paper argues that Lycurgus is largely excluded because his
moral project conflicts with modern ethical priorities centered on individual
autonomy, human rights, and personal agency. Additionally, the essay explores
the pedagogical difficulties posed by the authoritarian, militaristic, and
coercive dimensions of Spartan society, as well as the scholarly uncertainty
surrounding Lycurgus’ historical existence. Moving beyond ethics narrowly
conceived, the discussion also considers Lycurgus as a proto-collectivist
thinker whose reforms anticipate later debates on communal ownership, moral
discipline, and social harmony. Rather than advocating for Lycurgus’ ethical
model, the essay proposes his case as a valuable—though uncomfortable—tool
for higher-order ethical reflection and critical debate in university-level
education. |
Keywords: Lycurgus, Plutarch, Ethics, Ethics Education,
Sparta, Moral Education, Collectivism, Autonomy, Virtue, Social Agency |
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Resumen Este
ensayo analiza la escasa presencia de Licurgo, el legendario legislador
espartano, en los programas contemporáneos de ética y humanidades. A partir
de la Vida de Licurgo de Plutarco y del aporte de la investigación
clásica moderna, el texto sostiene que Licurgo suele quedar excluido debido a
que su proyecto moral entra en conflicto con los principios éticos actuales
centrados en la autonomía individual, los derechos humanos y la agencia
personal. Asimismo, se examinan las dificultades pedagógicas que plantea el
carácter autoritario, militarista y coercitivo de la sociedad espartana, así
como la incertidumbre historiográfica en torno a la existencia real de
Licurgo. Más allá de la ética en sentido estricto, el ensayo también
considera a Licurgo como un pensador proto-colectivista cuyas reformas
anticipan debates posteriores sobre propiedad comunal, disciplina moral y
armonía social. Lejos de proponer su modelo como ideal, el texto defiende su
valor como caso de estudio para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico y el
análisis ético de alto nivel en la educación universitaria. |
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Resumo Este ensaio examina a
ausência relativa de Licurgo, o lendário legislador espartano, nos currículos
contemporâneos de ética e humanidades. Com base principalmente na Vida de
Licurgo de Plutarco e no apoio da pesquisa clássica moderna, o texto
argumenta que Licurgo é frequentemente excluído por entrar em conflito com as
prioridades éticas atuais, centradas na autonomia individual, nos direitos
humanos e na agência pessoal. O ensaio também analisa as dificuldades
pedagógicas decorrentes das dimensões autoritárias, militaristas e
coercitivas da sociedade espartana, bem como as dúvidas historiográficas
sobre a existência histórica de Licurgo. Para além da ética normativa, o
estudo considera Licurgo como um pensador proto-coletivista cujas reformas
antecipam debates posteriores sobre propriedade comum, disciplina moral e
harmonia social. O objetivo não é defender seu modelo, mas apresentá-lo como
um estudo de caso provocador para o desenvolvimento do pensamento crítico e
da reflexão ética no ensino superior. |
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Introduction
Ethics curricula in modern universities
routinely highlight philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, Mill, and
contemporary moral theorists. Yet Lycurgus, the legendary Spartan lawgiver whom
Plutarch credits with reshaping an entire society, rarely appears in ethical
discussions, even as a counterexample. This absence is striking because
Lycurgus’ reforms are deeply ethical in scope: they governed desire,
citizenship, moral education, civic responsibility, and the
subordination of self-interest to collective welfare. Plutarch’s Life of
Lycurgus presents a figure who not only redesigned institutions but also
engineered a normative code for the Spartan way of life. Despite this, Lycurgus
is often excluded from humanities and ethics courses.
This essay (my blog post #522) argues that
Lycurgus is absent because (1) modern ethics emphasizes individual autonomy,
not collective discipline; (2) contemporary humanistic education avoids
valorizing illiberal or militaristic systems; and (3) scholarship questions the
historical reliability of Lycurgus, diminishing his value for philosophical
instruction. By examining Plutarch’s account and modern scholarship, this blog
post demonstrates why Lycurgus’ ideas remain largely undebated in contemporary
ethical education.
Lycurgus’ Ethical Project in Plutarch
Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus portrays the
Spartan lawgiver as a radical moral architect. His reforms are not merely legal
or political; they aim at shaping his countrypeople’s character. Plutarch
states that Lycurgus “bent the whole city to obedience, sobriety, and
temperance” (Plutarch, trans. 1914, p. 53), signaling a moral, not only
political, agenda. Central to this agenda was the suppression of luxury.
According to Plutarch, Lycurgus believed that “the city was like a ship whose
sailors mutinied when each pursued his own profit” (p. 57). The metaphor is
ethical: Moral disorder arises when individual desire overrides collective
good.
Lycurgus’ most famous reform, the agōgē,
was explicitly an ethical program for the Spartan youths. Plutarch writes that
Lycurgus “considered education the greatest and noblest task of the lawgiver”
(p. 61). Through training in endurance, discipline, and obedience, Spartans
internalized a civic ethic centered on virtue-as-duty. This emphasis on
habituation echoes Aristotelian virtue ethics yet differs in its extremity
since Aristotle advocates moderation, but Lycurgus enforces austerity and
communalism.
Thus, it can be stated that Lycurgus serves as a
profound case study in ethical and moral engineering. Yet despite this, he does
not appear in mainstream ethics curricula. But why not?
Reason 1: Lycurgus Conflicts with Modern Ethical Emphasis on Individual
Autonomy
Modern ethics education privileges frameworks
grounded in personal autonomy, rational choice, and the rights of individuals.
Philosophers such as Kant and Mill assume that individuals possess moral agency
independent of the state or any system of government. Lycurgus represents the
opposite pole: he dissolved individuality into collective identity. As Plutarch
notes, under Lycurgus, “no one was permitted to live as he pleased” (p. 65).
For Kantian educators, this represents heteronomy of the most extreme sort,
contrary to personal autonomy and agency.
Contemporary scholars share this same concern.
Cartledge (2002) argues that Spartan ethics “subordinate the individual so
fully to the polis that the very notion of personal moral agency becomes
blurred” (p. 88). For ethics instructors who aim to cultivate critical
thinking, freedom of conscience, and reflective autonomy, Lycurgus offers a
model fundamentally incompatible with contemporary pedagogical values. But his
social engineering can be used as a case study to be debated in an ethics
class.
In such a context, teaching Lycurgus risks
seeming to legitimize authoritarian virtue. Even if presented critically, his
system’s foundational rejection of autonomy limits its usefulness in ethics
classrooms centered on rational self-determination. For this very reason, an
ethics professor could bring Lycurgus case for debate and identification of its
flaws if analyzed from the importance of individual autonomy and citizen
agency.
Reason 2: The Moral Problems of Spartan Society Make Lycurgus
Pedagogically Difficult
Humanities departments are increasingly
attentive to issues of oppression, inequality, and structural violence. Yet
Lycurgus’ reforms institutionalized systems that are ethically troubling by
contemporary standards: the helot system, militarization of youth,
communal spying, infanticide, and near-total state control over family life.
Plutarch describes the helots as being “kept
down by force, and treated with arrogant cruelty” (p. 72). He further recounts
the infamous krypteia, during which young Spartans were encouraged “to
kill any helot they found in the fields” (p. 73). These passages pose severe
ethical challenges for instructors, but it is worthwhile to discuss why
students must be avoided. While scholars such as Hodkinson (2000) contextualize
the helot system as part of archaic Greek socioeconomics, its brutality remains
undeniable.
Thus, universities may avoid Lycurgus not out of oversight but out of pedagogical caution with beginning ethics students whose higher order thinking skills may not be fully developed; engaging seriously with his system requires complex discussions of violence, authoritarianism, and collective coercion whose examples can be drawn from current political affairs in various parts of the world. These topics can be valuable, but they conflict with the introductory and normative goals of many ethics courses.
Reason 3: Uncertainty About Lycurgus’ Historical Reality Reduces His
Philosophical Utility
Another major reason Lycurgus is not taught
stems from doubts about whether he existed at all. Plutarch himself admits that
“there is great disagreement among historians concerning Lycurgus” (p. 49).
Modern scholars are even more skeptical that this Spartan figure ever existed.
Powell (2018) notes that “Lycurgus is better understood as a mythic placeholder
for a gradual evolution of Spartan institutions” (p. 112). If the lawgiver is
semi-mythical, he cannot serve as a stable anchor for ethical analysis and class
discussions.
In ethics education, instructors typically rely
on thinkers with reliably attributed texts or verifiable historical roles, e.g.,
Aristotle, Confucius, Aquinas. Lycurgus produces a pedagogical challenge: his
ideas, at least as we know them, may belong more to Plutarch and the Spartan
tradition than to a historical individual who governed the Lacedemonians at a
given point in history. The lack of primary philosophical writings attributed
to Lycurgus further decreases academic interest.
Lycurgus as a Proto-Communist Thinker
Moving beyond ethics, some scholars have noted
that Lycurgus’ reforms anticipate certain features later associated with
communist or collectivist ideologies that emerged during the 20th century.
Although the term communism is anachronistic for antiquity, Lycurgus
instituted radical property redistribution, common messes, and the erasure of
visible economic inequality, measures that parallel, in spirit, Marxist
critiques of private ownership.
Plutarch writes that Lycurgus “persuaded them to
pool all their fortunes, and to dine together in public” (Plutarch, 1914, p.
59), a direct rejection of personal luxury and private consumption. Paul
Cartledge supports this interpretation when he states that Sparta under
Lycurgus “approached a uniquely collective socio-economic system, in which
individual wealth, ambition, and accumulation were morally suspect” (Cartledge,
2001, p. 144). Likewise, Hodkinson (2000) argues that Lycurgus engineered a
society in which wealth “had no visible function beyond serving the collective
ends of the state” (p. 212).
Through these reforms, Lycurgus can be seen as
one of the earliest figures to articulate a moral system premised on collective
ownership, economic leveling, and the moral suspicion of private desire, ideas
that resonate with later Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, collectivist philosophies
even if their foundations were militaristic rather than emancipatory.
Plutarch’s Vision of Lycurgus’ Ideal City
Plutarch’s characterization of Lycurgus’
political vision reveals an aspiration not for imperial power but for moral
harmony. His statement that Lycurgus believed “the happiness of a state, as of
a private man, consisted chiefly in the exercise of virtue, and in the concord
of the inhabitants” (Plutarch, 1914, p. 67) frames Sparta’s laws as a moral, not
merely political, project.
This vision distinguishes Lycurgus from later
collectivist thinkers: while modern communist theorists often emphasize
economic justice or class struggle, Lycurgus’ reforms aim at cultivating virtue
and sustaining concord. As Andrew Powell (2018) notes, Lycurgus’ city is
imagined as “a harmonized organism whose stability derives from moral
discipline and shared purpose rather than from political expansion” (p. 129).
In this sense, Lycurgus’ project mirrors ancient virtues more than modern
ideological systems. His goal was to create citizens “free-minded,
self-dependent, and temperate,” as Plutarch writes, a combination that scholars
such as Tigerstedt (1974) interpret as the core of the Spartan ethical ideal, citizens
who, shaped by communal structures, embody the moral clarity that Lycurgus
believed impossible in societies ruled by wealth, luxury, or unchecked
individual freedom.
Plutarch’s description thus elevates Lycurgus
beyond the role of lawgiver to that of moral philosopher, presenting his city
as a unified ethical organism.
Conclusion
Lycurgus represents a compelling but deeply
problematic figure for ethics education. Plutarch’s account portrays him as a
moral reformer whose laws engineered a society of discipline, austerity, and
civic devotion. Yet these same qualities, collective over individual, coercive
over voluntary, militaristic over humanistic, clash with modern ethical
frameworks based on autonomy, rights, and critical inquiry. Moreover, the
ethically troubling aspects of Spartan society and the ambiguous historicity of
Lycurgus himself complicate pedagogical use. For these reasons, Lycurgus is
seldom taught in university ethics courses, despite his profound influence on
ancient moral thought. His absence is not accidental but reflective of modern
ethical priorities and educational aims.
San José, Costa Rica
Monday, February 2,
2026
📚 References
Cartledge,
P. (2001). Spartan reflections. University of California Press.
Cartledge,
P. (2002). Sparta and Lakonia: A regional history, 1300–362 BC (2nd
ed.). Routledge.
Hodkinson,
S. (2000). Property and wealth in classical Sparta. Duckworth.
Plutarch.
(1914). Lives of the noble Grecians and Romans (B. Perrin, Trans.).
Harvard University Press. (Original work published ca. A.D. 100)
Powell, A.
(2018). Sparta: The body politic. Classical Press of Wales.
Tigerstedt,
E. N. (1974). The legend of Sparta in classical antiquity: Vol. 1.
Spartiatae. Almqvist & Wiksell.
Reader's Handout
Reader's Handout by Jonathan Acuña
A Fictitious Dialogue with Lycurgus
Why Lycurgus is Rarely Taught in Ethics Education - A Critical Examination of the Spartan Lawgiver by Jonathan Acuña
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